References
The ‘thing-in-itself’ (which would be precisely, pure truth, truth without consequences) is impossible for even the creator of language to grasp, and indeed this is not at all desirable.
We possess only metaphors of things which in no way correspond to the original entities
Making equivalent which is non-equivalent
Dropping these individual differences arbitrarily
Forgetting those features which differentiate one thing from another
Clumsy pair of hands
Omitting what is unlike
Overlooking what is individual and real
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How Concepts are formed
- Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying
in a Non-Moral Sense”
A
mobile
army of metaphors
The ‘thing-in-itself’ (which would be precisely, pure truth, truth without consequences) is impossible for even the creator of language to grasp, and indeed this is not at all desirable.
We possess only metaphors of things which in no way correspond to the original entities
Making equivalent which is non-equivalent
Dropping these individual differences arbitrarily
Forgetting those features which differentiate one thing from another
Clumsy pair of hands
Omitting what is unlike
Overlooking what is individual and real
